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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
EARL SAMPSON and LERLYNN C. 
SAMPSON, his wife; GULF OIL 
CORPORATION; FIRST STATE 
BANK OF SALINA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CASE NO. 74-11-639 -4 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is a condemnation by the Utah 
State Road Commission to acquire certain real property 
in Sevier County for the purpose of constructing a 
highway connecting the city of Salina to the 1-70 
freeway. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on the issue of amount 
of compensation to be paid to the landowners. After 
trial, the state made a motion for a new trial which 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was denied by the District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Utah State Road Commission, plaintiff-
appellant in the action, seeks a reversal of the court's 
denial together with an order that the case be remanded 
for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
By this action in eminent domain the State 
of Utah sought to acquire 3.21 acres in fee from a 
tract belonging to defendants consisting of 6.96 
acres. The taking divided the tract into two portions 
with 0.96 acres remaining on the east side of the new 
highway and 2.79 acres on the west. In addition, 
there was a limited access line established along the 
boundary of the taking. Defendants, by this limited 
access line, were denied access to the 0.96 acres 
remaining east of the highway. A map illustrating 
the property and the taking is included at the end of 
this brief as a reference for the convenience of the 
court. 
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At trial on June 12 and 13, 1975, the range 
of testimony as to the just compensation to be paid 
was presented as follows: 
Mr. Harry Dyson for the State (T. 135, 
138, 163): 
Land and improvements taken $ 9,699 
Damages to remaining land and 
improvements 22,532 
TOTAL $32,228 
Mr. Alden Adams for the State (T. 190, 
193, 194): 
Land taken $ 8,025 
Damages to remaining land 2,834 
Improvements taken and damages 
to remaining improvements 31,196 
TOTAL $42,055 
96-97): 
Mr. Memory Cain for the condemnees (T. 
Land taken $ 8,025 
Damages to remaining land 2,610 
Improvements taken 4,387 
Damages to remaining improvements 47,960 
TOTAL $63,000 
Mr. Earl Sampson, the landowner (T. 43-48): 
Land taken (3.21 acres at 
$5,000/acre) $16,050 
Damages to remaining land 5,800 
Improvements taken and damages 
to remaining improvements 60,000 
TOTAL $81,850 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The jury returned a verdict of $16,050 for 
"market value of property taken by the State" and 
$46,950 for "damages, if any, to remaining land and 
improvements by reason of severance." This made a 
total just compensation, as determined by the jury, of 
$63,000. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PORTION OF THE VERDICT CONCERNING VALUE 
OF PROPERTY TAKEN WAS EXCESSIVE AND CONTRARY TO THE 
CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
Several expert witnesses submitted their 
opinions at trial as to the value of the subject 
property. The highest of such expert testimony was given 
by Mr. Memory Cain who was called by the defendants. 
He testified that defendants should be awarded a 
total of $63,000 as just compensation in the case. 
Mr. Cain broke this total figure into $12,412 for 
land and improvements taken and $50f570 for damages 
- • • * ' 
to land and improvements which were not taken. 
(T. 96-97) . 
The jury awarded a total of $63,000 which is 
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the same as the amount testified to by Mr. Cain. 
The breakdown arrived at by the jury between value of 
taking and severance damages is# however, different 
than the expert testimony. The verdict on amount of 
severance damages was $46,950. This is within the 
range of the expert valuation testimony submitted at 
trial and that portion of the verdict is not challenged 
by appellant. 
The jury verdict for property taken was 
$16,050. This is $3,638 in excess of the high expert 
testimony as to value of property taken. Because there 
is no expert testimony to support this portion of the 
verdict (the testimony of the state's appraisers 
being substantially lower than that of Mr. Cain), it 
is excessive. In making the determination of the value 
of property taken, the jury chose to ignore the tes-
timony of all of the expert appraisers. In so doing, 
the jury chose the personal, inexpert, unobjective, 
and obviously self-serving testimony of Mr. Sampson, 
the landowner, rather than the clear preponderance of 
of expert opinion based on market values and experience. 
Mr. Sampson testified that the land taken had a value 
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of $60,000 (T. 43-48). 
Although the total of the verdict is within 
the range of expert testimony, the value of property 
taken is not. That a verdict in a condemnation can 
be improper and is reversible when only a portion 
of it exceeds the testimony, is clear from State Road 
Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 347 
(1968). In that case, the verdict of the jury on 
severance damages exceeded the testimony of any witnes 
as to amount of severance damage. The total of the 
verdict for taking and damage, however, was within the 
total testimony. The court held that the verdict 
should be reversed because a part of it exceeded any 
evidence presented at trial. 
In this case, the amount of the verdict for 
property taken exceeds all expert evidence in the 
record. It is within the amount testified to by the 
landowner himself but that testimony is not substan-
tial enough to support the verdict. - . 
The general rule is that the owner of 
property is permitted to testify at trial of a con-
demnation case. It does not necessarily follow, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
however, that because he is allowed to testify, that 
the testimony which he gives is sufficient to support 
a jury verdict. The court stated the criteria which 
should be used to determine when the testimony of the 
property owner will support a verdict in excess of 
expert appraisal testimony in the case of State Road 
Commission v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507 (1970). 
In that case the jury awarded to the defendants the 
exact amount which had been testified to by the 
defendant, Lewis R. Dillree. That amount exceeded 
by some $1,600 the amount which was testified to by 
the highest of the expert witnesses who were called 
at the trial. The case was appealed by the condemnor 
who contended that since the verdict exceeded the 
expert testimony, it was excessive and should be 
reversed. The court upheld the verdict and said that 
the testimony of the property owner was sufficient to 
support the verdict in this type of case because the 
following conditions were met: (1) There is no other 
evidence except the amount of the verdict which indicates 
that the verdict was determined by passion and 
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prejudice; (2) The testimony of the landowner is 
credible, based upon his qualifications to testify; 
and (3) The owners estimate is reasonable and does 
not exceed the expert estimate by more than a small 
amount. 25 Utah 2d at 186# 
The Dillree criteria are further illuminated 
by Utah State Road Commission v. The Steele Ranch, 533 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1975). In the Steele Ranch case, 
the court struck down a jury verdict of severance 
damages which had no support in the evidence except 
the estimate given by Dr. Steele, the owner of the 
property being condemned. Dr. Steele testified that 
the ranch property had suffered severance damage in 
the amount of $100,000. In examining this evidence 
the court said: 
"[There]... is some appre-
hension as to its soundness... 
because it is so greatly in 
excess of the values placed, 
thereon by the expert witnesses, 
who, with their expert know-
ledge, appear to have made 
careful analyses and computa-
tions concerning the values, 
including the severance 
damage. The estimate of 
$21,057 by expert Smith for 
the Road Commission, was more 
-8-
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than doubled to $47,791 by 
Mr. Harding, the defendant's 
expert; and Dr. Steele more 
than doubled that again in 
reaching his estimate of 
$100,000, nearly five times 
the estimate of Mr. Smith. 
It is appreciated that it 
is often stated that an owner 
may testify to the value of 
his property. We have no 
doubt that this is generally 
a safe and proper rule. But 
it is also true that when 
general rules are applied to 
specific circumstances 
difficulties are ofttimes 
encountered. It takes but . 
brief reflection to realize 
that a person may come into 
ownership of property by in-
heritance, or otherwise, who 
may not have any realistic 
idea of its value. If it 
should so appear, the evidence 
would have no probative use 
and should be deemed incompe-
tent; and this may be true 
in varying degrees, with a 
corresponding effect upon its 
credibility. In our case it 
does appear that Dr. Steele 
had had considerable experience 
in dealings in property. Never-
theless, there is the important 
factor somewhat related to 
the above, that his estimate 
of severance damages, especially 
when it involved property 
owned by him, including his own 
home, may well have been suf-
fused with a high degree of self-
interest. " 533 P.2d 888. 
_9_ 
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In Steele Ranch, the court makes no mention 
of evidence of passion and prejudice other than the 
excessive verdict. Despite the owner's past dealings 
in property, the court found that his estimate was so 
far in excess of the estimate of the experts as to 
indicate that the evidence was influenced by a high 
degress of self-interest. Even applying the Dillree 
criteria, it appears that the most important considera-
tion looked at by the court was the excessiveness of
 : 
the verdict. ., ...._.. . 
If the Dillree standards concerning the 
sufficiency of a landowner's testimony to support a 
verdict are applied to this case, it is evident that 
the verdict cannot stand. The first of the Dillree 
criteria appears to be met here. There is no evidence 
that the verdict was influenced by passion or pre-
judice except the amount of the verdict. As noted 
above, however, this excessiveness is an extremely 
important consideration in determining whether the 
verdict is proper. In the Silliman case, Supra, there 
was likewise no evidence of passion or prejudice except 
the excessiveness of the verdict. The court, neverthe-
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less, looked on that as an important consideration in 
determining whether the verdict was proper and ordered 
a new trial. 
The second and third of the Dillree criteria 
are not met in this case. The testimony of Mr* Sampson 
concerning the land value is without any sufficient 
support or basis. On direct examination, Mr. Sampson 
admitted that he had not had any real estate dealings 
in the county other than purchase of the subject 
property (T.42). He had been in operation at the same 
location since 1958 (T. 40) and so had neither bought 
nor sold any real property in the area for at least 
sixteen years at the date of taking. At one point, 
Mr. Sampson also said that he had not had occasion to 
"observe and inquire into the sales of other property 
in the area" (T. 43), although other parts of the 
record indicate that he had made some such inquiries. 
On cross-examination regarding the sales 
which Mr. Sampson used to arrive at his estimate of 
land value, he said that the sales were of small 
lots, that he could not recall how large they were, 
not what the selling price was (T. 52-53). He only 
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said that he figured it would come to about $5,000 
per acre. No support for his calculations was offered 
by the defendant. 
The fact that Mr. Sampson had been in the 
dairy business for a great number of years may have 
qualified him as an expert concerning the operation 
of a dairy, the cost of such an operation, the value 
. —OXf. 
of and replacement cost of the milking parlor and other 
improvements, and the ability to carry on the operation 
at the subject property in its condition after the 
taking. It does not, however, qualify him as an 
expert on the value of real property. By his own 
admission he had not had any dealings in real property. 
The only basis which he could offer for his estimate 
of $5,000 per acre was some general inquiries and some 
lot sales for which he did not know either the size 
nor price. That was the entire extent of his qualifica-
tions to testify as to land value. 
Mr. Sampson's testimony likewise fails to 
meet the last of the Dillree standards. The testimony 
of Mr. Sampson was more than just a small amount over 
the estimates of the expert witnesses. Mr. Sampson 
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placed a value on the land taken of $5,000 per acre. 
This was double the appraisal of Mr. Cain, his own 
witness, who arrived at a value of $2,500 per acre for 
the property taken (T. 89-90). The experts called by 
the State testified to a value at or below that tes-
tified to by Mr. Cain. Mr. Sampson's testimony of the 
value of the improvements is likewise greatly in 
excess of the experts' estimates. In total, the 
testimony of the landowner concerning the amount of 
compensation he should receive is nearly $19,000 
above that of the highest expert and nearly $40,000 
above that of the highest expert called by the State, 
Some other jurisdictions have also recognized 
that although a landowner is permitted to testify, 
his testimony may not be sufficient to support the 
verdict. In the case of State v. Barnes, 443 P.2d 16 
(Mont. 1968), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a 
lower court and held that a new trial was proper 
when the jury returned a land value above the expert's 
opinion, even though the total award of $44,379 was 
well under the highest total testimony of $92,000 by 
Mr. Barnes, the landowner. The court said: 
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"It is a fundamental and 
well established rule of law 
that the burden of proof as 
to the amount of damages in 
condemnation proceedings is 
upon the property owner. Here, 
by expert testimony, the high-
est figure for the land and 
improvements taken was 
$9,856 and the trial court 
erred in denying a motion for 
new trial when the jury failed 
to find in this or a lesser 
amount." State v. Barnes, 
443 P.2d 16 (Mont. 1968). .ia 
The same reasoning which was used by the Montana court 
in Barnes is also applicable to this case. The logic 
of Justice Henriod in his concurring opinion in the 
Dillree case is instructive here. In discussing the 
court's affirmance of the verdict in that case which 
was in excess of the defendant's top expert witness's 
figure, Justice Henriod said: 
"He called his witness and 
should accept his figure, 
since his evidence is no 
stronger than his strongest 
link, much less its weakest, 
and his own testimony, obvious-
' ly self-serving...should be 
restricted to the test of his 
own chosen expert witnesses 
based on market, not opinion 
v value." 25 Utah 2d at 186. 
In summary, it appears that there is no 
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substantial evidence to support the jury verdict 
concerning value of property taken. The testimony 
of Mr. Sampson is not sufficient because he is not an 
expert on the subject. The mere fact that he is the 
owner of the property is not enough. The standards 
of the Dillree case were not met in that the testimony 
had no substantial basis in fact and it was more than 
a small amount above the estimate of the experts who 
testified in the case. Mr. Sampson's testimony as 
to land value was, in fact, double that of the highest 
expert. For these reasons, the verdict lacks the 
necessary support in the evidence and must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
HAROLD D. MITCHELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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